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INTRODUCTION
Human rights, as set out in the International Bill of Rights roughly forty years ago,
have not lived up to their drafters’ hopes.1 Some argue that they have not come close.2
Even their champions recognize their limits. As Professor Philip Alston notes, “[i]n
absolute figures, never have so many men, women, and children been subjugated,
starved, or exterminated on the Earth.”3 The shortcomings of human rights law are
often blamed on weak enforcement. Because nation states resist restraints on their
sovereignty, human rights law depends in large part on states policing themselves.
On the international level, United Nations agencies and nongovernmental
organizations (NGOs) monitor and report on human rights violations, but they have
no authority to sanction violators or compel remedies.
This Article proposes another mechanism for enforcement, an alternative to selfserving domestic policing and weak international bureaucracy. “Intercountry,” as
opposed to “international,” human rights would apply to specific rights in specific
contexts and be enforceable through the legal mechanisms and other resources of the
state parties that accepted them.4 Intercountry adoption is a useful context in which
to consider this proposal for several reasons.
First, as a practical matter, there have probably never been more babies and
children in orphanages, on the street, on the market, or on their own.5 Yet

1. The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Jan. 3, 1976,
993 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Economic Covenant]; and the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, Mar. 23, 1976, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter Civil Covenant]; together with
G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Dec. 10, 1948); comprise the
International Bill of Rights, globally recognized as the definitive law of international human
rights. DAVID WEISSBRODT, FIONNUALA NÍ AOLÁIN, JOAN FITZPATRICK & FRANK NEWMAN,
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS: LAW, POLICY, AND PROCESS 13–14 (4th ed. 2009).
2. See, e.g., SAMUEL MOYN, THE LAST UTOPIA: HUMAN RIGHTS IN HISTORY (2010); ERIC
A. POSNER, THE TWILIGHT OF HUMAN RIGHTS LAW (2014). The drafters set a high bar. See,
e.g., MARY ANN GLENDON, A WORLD MADE NEW: ELEANOR ROOSEVELT AND THE UNIVERSAL
DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 223 (2001). As John P. Humphrey pointed out, “Article One
[of the UN Charter] puts the promotion of respect for human rights on the same level as the
maintenance of international peace and security as a purpose of the United Nations.” John P.
Humphrey, The International Law of Human Rights in the Middle Twentieth Century, in THE
PRESENT STATE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 75, 84 (Maarten Bos ed., 1973).
3. Philip Alston, Does the Past Matter? On the Origins of Human Rights, 126 HARV. L.
REV. 2043, 2064 (2013).
4. See infra Sections III.C.1, III.C.2.
5. These categories are fluid, as babies and children move among them, and
“orphanages” include group homes and other forms of nonfamily care. According to United
Nations sources, there are 140 million orphans (defined as a child who has lost one or both

2020]

IN TER C OU N T R Y H U MA N RI GH T S

1367

intercountry adoptions have declined to levels not seen for almost forty years.6
Intercountry human rights would focus states on some of their most vulnerable
people. They would also better protect would-be adoptive parents from a range of
risks, from their children’s trauma to their own unknowing complicity in serious
human rights violations.7
Second, from a jurisprudential perspective, since virtually all of the states
involved in intercountry adoption have ratified virtually all of the human rights
instruments applicable in this context, the applicable human rights law is not in
dispute.8 Receiving states and states of origin, moreover, presumably have a common
goal—the best interest of the child. This is very different from the ideological conflict
at the core of other interstate efforts to promote human rights, such as the Alien Tort
Statute (ATS) litigation.9 Foreign support for human rights may also be more

parents). Orphans, UNICEF: PRESS CTR., www.unicef.org/media/media_45279.html
[https://perma.cc/MQ87-3TKP] (last updated June 16, 2015). There are “up to 150 million
street children.” Street Children, UNESCO, https://wayback.archive-it.org/10611/2017020
5023736/http://portal.unesco.org/shs/en/ev.php-URL_ID=11403&URL_DO=DO_TOPIC&
URL_SECTION=201.html [https://perma.cc/PLJ4-PWXU] (last updated Nov. 29, 2007); see
also D. MARIANNE BLAIR, MERLE H. WEINER, BARBARA STARK & SOLANGEL MALDONADO,
FAMILY LAW IN THE WORLD COMMUNITY 825–29 (3rd ed. 2015) (noting that many street
children have families and are not eligible for adoption). Experts estimate that thirty percent
of all detected trafficked persons are children but are currently unable to reliably aggregate
data. UNODC, GLOBAL REPORT ON TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS 10 (2018),
https://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/glotip/2018/GLOTiP_2018_BOOK_we
b_small.pdf [https://perma.cc/2DMT-498B]. The children “on their own” refer to children
who are not living in families but are not included in these data.
6. Miriam Jordan, Foreign Adoptions by Americans Drop to Lowest Level Since 1982,
WALL ST. J. (Apr. 1, 2015, 2:19 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/foreign-adoptions-by
-americans-drop-to-lowest-level-since-1982-1427837631
[https://perma.cc/7LF6-MJRB].
According to Professor Peter Selman, there were a total of 8299 adoptions in 2018, compared
to 43,860 in 2005. PETER SELMAN, GLOBAL STATISTICS FOR INTERCOUNTRY ADOPTION:
RECEIVING STATES AND STATES OF ORIGIN 2005-2018, at 2 (2019), https://assets.hcch.net/docs
/a8fe9f19-23e6-40c2-855e-388e112bf1f5.pdf [https://perma.cc/78K7-6XQX].
7. These risks are not mutually exclusive. See, e.g., David M. Smolin, The Corrupting
Influence of the United States on a Vulnerable Intercountry Adoption System: A Guide for
Stakeholders, Hague and Non-Hague Nations, NGOs, and Concerned Parties, 15 UTAH L.
REV. 1065 (2013) (describing his discovery that his adopted daughters were not, in fact,
orphans); see also Russell Goldman, An Adoption Nightmare, ABC NEWS (May 14, 2008, 9:08
AM), https://abcnews.go.com/International/story?id=4823713&page=1 [https://perma.cc/AU
5Y-ZQK5] (describing the Smolins’ ordeal).
8. These would include, in addition to the International Bill of Rights, see supra note 1,
the Convention on the Rights of the Child, Sept. 2, 1990, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter CRC],
and the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, Dec.
18, 1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13 [hereinafter CEDAW]. The United States, which has only ratified
the Civil Covenant, is the conspicuous outlier. Agreement on the applicable human rights law
might suggest that intercountry human rights are unnecessary, if not redundant. As noted
above and explained below, however, ratification is not compliance.
9. Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2012); see also infra Section III.C.1.c
(discussing the ATS litigation).
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palatable when it involves family law, rather than ostensibly more important issues
of trade or national security.10
Finally, from a more theoretical perspective, the rise and fall of intercountry
adoption, from the 1950s to the present, demonstrates the deep tension between
human rights and global capitalism. By “global capitalism” I refer to capitalism
unrestrained by national laws or shared ethical codes, what David Brooks calls
“naked capitalism.”11 Intercountry adoption exposes the human costs of global
capitalism in a specific, concrete, international context.
Part I of this Article describes the origins of the tension between human rights and
global capitalism in the Cold War era, from the end of World War II to the collapse
of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s. It explains how the American version of
human rights veered off from the international version and why the American version
prevailed. This Part also shows how the American version of human rights promoted
intercountry adoption.
Part II explains how global capitalism changed the game.12 This Part focuses on
the heyday of neoliberalism, from the elections of Ronald Reagan and Margaret
Thatcher to the Great Recession beginning in 2008. It shows how neoliberalism
reshaped human rights and produced a perverse “solution” for children in crisis.
Part III explains why intercountry adoption requires intercountry human rights. It
begins by examining the unprecedented inequality that currently characterizes the
global economy. It explains why the Hague Convention on Intercountry Adoption,13
enacted in the United States in 2008, cannot address the problems this creates for
transborder adoptions. Rather, intercountry adoption requires the revival of the full
panoply of international human rights and a fresh approach to their realization.
Part IV proposes a theory of intercountry human rights, drawing on the
eighteenth-century philosopher Thomas Paine and the twenty-first-century
economist Thomas Picketty. It explains how intercountry human rights would apply
in the context of intercountry adoption and concludes by describing how intercountry
human rights might operate in practice.

10. See Martha Minow, Forming Underneath Everything that Grows: Toward a History
of Family Law, 1985 WIS. L. REV. 819, 819 (1985) (noting the low status of family law within
the legal profession).
11. David Brooks, Opinion, Moral Vacuum in the House of Trump, N.Y. TIMES (July 14,
2017), https://nyti.ms/2uggqeR [https://perma.cc/2LUY-MQ77] (noting that, beyond loyalty
to their own family, the Trumps have “no attachment to any external moral truth or ethical
code. There is just naked capitalism.”). This is, in part, what has made globalization so wildly
lucrative—twenty-first century markets coupled with an absence of enforceable labor, human
rights, or environmental laws last seen in the nineteenth century. I am not suggesting that all
global enterprises lack such restraints, but they were in short supply in the major sending states
described in Sections I.B.3 and II.B, infra.
12. Global capitalism, in its current iteration, was made possible by neoliberalism, which
became a juggernaut in the 1990s and the first decade of the 2000’s, particularly after the
collapse of the Soviet Union. See infra Section II.A.
13. Convention on Protection of Children and Cooperation in Respect to Intercountry
Adoption, May 29, 1993, 1870 U.N.T.S. 182.
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HOW THE COLD WAR SHAPED HUMAN RIGHTS

Human rights were an idealistic “Never again!” to the horrors of the Holocaust
and World War II.14 The international committee that drafted the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, chaired by Eleanor Roosevelt, drew on the
Enlightenment and the French and American Revolutions to declare that everyone—
whatever race, religion, or gender—was entitled to civil and political rights as well
as economic, social, and cultural rights.15 Civil and political rights included the
familiar constitutional rights to assemble, organize, protest, and vote. Economic,
social, and cultural rights were less familiar to most Americans. They included rights
to an adequate standard of living, health, education, and work. 16
This Part first explains how the American version of human rights deviates from
the international version. It then describes why the American version prevailed.
Finally, it shows how this version of human rights promoted intercountry adoption.
A. The Difference Between “American” and “International” Human Rights
Although Americans had been among the earliest proponents of international
human rights after World War II, by the time the Civil Covenant and the Economic
Covenant came into force in 1976,17 the United States had for all practical purposes
abandoned the project. It had neither signed nor ratified either Covenant and was not
represented on the committees charged with monitoring them.
The United States’ rejection of international human rights was led in the 1950s by
southern conservatives in Congress. They claimed that international human rights
violated states’ rights.18 What they meant was that the explicit prohibitions against

14. This is the conventional story. See, e.g., LOUIS HENKIN, SARAH H. CLEVELAND,
LAURENCE R. HELFER, GERALD L. NEUMAN & DIANE F. ORENTLICHER, HUMAN RIGHTS 135 (2d
ed. 2009); HENRY J. STEINER, PHILIP ALSTON & RYAN GOODMAN, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN
RIGHTS IN CONTEXT: LAW, POLITICS, MORALS 133 (3d ed. 2008). It is a grand story, and has
been told often, sometimes eloquently. See, e.g., LOUIS HENKIN, THE AGE OF RIGHTS (1990);
see also GLENDON, supra note 2.
15. GLENDON, supra note 2, at xvii.
16. See Economic Covenant, supra note 1, at art. 11 (standard of living); id. at art. 12
(health); id. at art. 13; id. at art. 14 (education); id. at art. 7 (work).
17. See supra note 1.
18. See, e.g., The International Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the
Crime of Genocide: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on the Genocide Convention of the S.
Comm. on Foreign Relations, 81st Cong. 208 (1950) (statement of Carl B. Rix, Vice
Chairman, Spec. Comm. on Peace and Law Through United Nations of the Am. Bar Ass’n).
[A]re we ready to surrender the power of the States over such matters to the
Federal Government? . . . The report of the Civil Rights Committee appointed by
the President, after considering the division of power over civil rights between
the Federal Government and the States, in two places refers to the added power
which may be given to Congress in the field of civil rights if the human-rights
treaty is ratified and approved.
Id.

1370

IN DIA NA LA W J OU R NA L

[Vol. 95:1365

racial discrimination set out in the International Bill of Rights threatened still-legal
segregation in the South.19 They were right.
They were able to prevent the United States from ratifying human rights treaties,
but they could not prevent international political pressure. The Soviets distributed
photographs of the police attacking civil rights marchers with fire hoses and German
shepherds throughout the Third World.20 People in the newly independent states
throughout Asia and Africa were appalled. “Desegregation [became] a Cold War
imperative,” as legal historian Mary Duziak later showed.21
But international human rights law remained anathema in the United States. It did
not ratify the Civil Covenant until 1992,22 after the fall of the Soviet Union. Even
then, it did so with the caveat that the Civil Covenant is “non-self-executing,”
meaning that it does not operate as law in the United States and cannot be relied upon
in U.S. courts.23
The American version of human rights remains limited to civil and political rights.
The United States has still not ratified the Economic Covenant, which it equated with
communism during the Cold War.24 The United States has long been wary of
economic rights.25 It was the richest country in the world after World War II, and
capitalism was its driving force, the engine of its prosperity. The myth that anyone
willing to work hard could be successful in America persists. Long after the fall of

19. See id. For an overview of the efforts to apply the human rights provisions of the
United Nations Charter in state and federal United States courts from 1946 to 1955, see Bert
B. Lockwood, Jr., The United Nations Charter and United States Civil Rights Litigation: 19461955, 69 IOWA L. REV. 901, 902 (1984).
20. Vicki Goldberg, PHOTOGRAPHY VIEW; Remembering the Faces in the Civil Rights
Struggle, N.Y. TIMES: PHOTOGRAPHY VIEW (July 17, 1994), https://nyti.ms/298Aqrn
[https://perma.cc/K8T3-RK6T].
21. Mary L. Dudziak, Desegregation as a Cold War Imperative, 41 STAN. L. REV. 61, 62–
63 (1988); see Brief for the United States as Amici Curiae at 7, Brown v. Board of Education
(Brown I), 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (Nos. 8, 101, 191, 413, 448) (“Soviet spokesmen [are using
the] . . . undeniable existence of racial discrimination [as] . . . propaganda warfare.”).
22. See Civil Covenant, supra note 1 (entered into force Sep. 8, 1992). For the text of the
Resolution of Ratification, see S. Exec. Doc. No. 102-23, at 21 (1992).
23. See Louis Henkin & W. Michael Reisman, U.S. Ratification of Human Rights
Conventions: The Ghost of Senator Bricker, 89 AM. J. INT’L L. 341, 341 (1995).
24. See Philip Alston, U.S. Ratification of the Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights: The Need for an Entirely New Strategy, 84 AM. J. INT’L L. 365 (1990).
25. I have set out the major reasons for this antipathy, at least on the federal level, in a
series of articles. See, e.g., Barbara Stark, Deconstructing the Framers’ Right to Property:
Liberty’s Daughters and Economic Rights, 28 HOFSTRA L. REV. 963 (2000) (explaining how
economic rights were ignored by the Framers); Barbara Stark, Postmodern Rhetoric,
Economic Rights and an International Text: “A Miracle for Breakfast,” 33 VA. J. INT’L L. 433
(1993) (explaining how economic rights were preempted by the rhetoric of opportunity);
Barbara Stark, The Future of the Fourteenth Amendment and International Human Rights
Law: The Black Heritage Trail, 13 TEMP. POL. & C.R. L. REV. 557 (2004) (explaining how
racism shaped American perceptions of economic rights). On the state level, in contrast,
economic rights have been widely embraced. See Barbara Stark, Economic Rights in the
United States and International Human Rights Law: Toward an “Entirely New Strategy,” 44
HASTINGS L.J. 79 (1992).
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the Soviet Union, Americans remain suspicious of socialism, 26 although this may be
changing.27
The American version of human rights has become the dominant model globally
for two related but distinct reasons. First, the collapse of the Soviet Union eliminated
the competition. The nonaligned states in the developing world could no longer play
the communist Soviets and the capitalist Americans off against each other.28 The
United States was the only remaining superpower. Second, neoliberal ideology has
become ubiquitous.29 According to the neoliberals, material well-being is best
assured by free, unrestrained markets.30
B. How the American Version of Human Rights Promoted Intercountry Adoption
When parents cannot care for their infants, another member of the family or
community usually steps up. According to historian Peter Conn, adoption is ancient
and well-documented throughout the world.31 But legal adoption by strangers, in
which all ties to the family of origin are severed, was rare until nineteenth century

26. See generally Mark Leibovich, Socialism! Boo, Hiss, Repeat, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 28,
2009), https://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/01/weekinreview/01leibovich.html [https://perma
.cc/TU8S-G8BC] (noting that shortly after the Great Recession began, the “socialist bogeymantra has made a full-scale return after a long stretch of relative dormancy” as conservatives
attack “bank bailouts, budget blowouts and stimulus bills”).
27. See, e.g., Michelle Goldberg, Opinion, No Wonder Millennials Hate Capitalism, N.Y.
TIMES, https://nyti.ms/2kq324J [https://perma.cc/E3CD-59C3] (Dec. 4, 2017) (citing a survey
finding that “44 percent of millennials would prefer to live in a socialist country, compared
with 42 percent who wanted to live under capitalism”); Corey Robin, Opinion, The New
Socialists, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 24, 2018), https://nyti.ms/2BJj0io [https://perma.cc/853BBULZ] (“Public support for socialism is growing. Self-identified socialists like Bernie
Sanders, Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez and Rashida Tlaib are making inroads into the Democratic
Party . . . .”); Simon van Zuylen-Wood, Pinkos Have More Fun; Socialism Is AOC’s Calling
Card, Trump’s Latest Rhetorical Bludgeon, and a New Way to Date in Brooklyn, N.Y. MAG.
(Mar. 3, 2019), https://nymag.com/intelligencer/2019/03/socialism-and-young-socialists.html
[https://perma.cc/V2LX-PZ86] (“Until very recently, it wasn’t that socialism was toxic in a
red-scare way. It was irrelevant, in a dust-bin-of-history way. But then came Bernie Sanders[]
[and] . . . the spectacular rise of Ocasio-Cortez. . . . For Ocasio-Cortez, Sanders, and most of
their devotees, . . . ” socialism isn’t a “planned economy that replaces market capitalism . . .
[but a] robust version of New Deal liberalism—or, perhaps, Northern European social
democracy.”).
28. Robert Howse, The End of the Globalization Debate: A Review Essay, 121 HARV. L.
REV. 1528, 1529 (2008) (noting the “new pro-market consensus”).
29. I have explained the ubiquity of neoliberalism and the growing challenges to its
hegemony elsewhere. See Barbara Stark, When Genealogy Matters: Intercountry Adoption,
International Human Rights, and Global Neoliberalism, 51 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 159,
196–97 (2018) (Section IV.A.1 The Ubiquity of Neoliberalism). Its role in intercountry
adoption is set out in Part II, infra.
30. See infra Part II.
31. See PETER CONN, ADOPTION: A BRIEF SOCIAL AND CULTURAL HISTORY 27–56 (2013)
(anecdotal accounts of adoption dating back to 1772 BCE and documentation of adoptions
from Mesopotamia through the Middle East, China, Europe, and Oceania).
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America. In Europe, the Church condemned adoption.32 The importance of blood ties
and the maintenance of family registries discouraged the adoption of babies or
children throughout Asia, with the exception of India. In Muslim states, stranger
adoption was prohibited; orphans were the responsibility of relatives under kafalah.33
As Professor Barbara Melosh notes:
The emergence of modern adoption required a radically different
understanding of family, one that overturned deeply held beliefs about
blood and nurture, obligation and love, choice and chance. It was no
accident that the United States was the crucible of this kind of adoption:
in its repudiation of the past and its confidence in social engineering,
adoption is quintessentially American.34
The American version of human rights, similarly, is quintessentially American. It
remains limited to civil and political rights. From the beginning, the United States
cut itself off from the broader, richer tradition of international human rights, as well
as from the international institutions that nourished human rights and helped them
develop.35 The United States still hasn’t ratified the Economic Covenant, which
recognizes the right of everyone to “an adequate standard of living,”36 and, more
specifically, that the “widest possible protection and assistance should be accorded
to the family.”37 In the United States, poverty is not the state’s responsibility—even
poverty caused by the government itself.38 Rather, it is the responsibility of the family
or the individual.
Nor has the United States ratified the Convention on the Rights of the Child
(CRC)39—the only country in the world not to do so. The CRC, in addition to
affirming the child’s economic rights, explicitly recognizes the child’s right to know
her parents, to be part of a family and part of a community.40 Article 29 provides that

32. The Church preferred childless men of property to leave their property to the Church,
rather than to adopt heirs. Id.
33. Id. at 55.
34. BARBARA MELOSH, STRANGERS AND KIN: THE AMERICAN WAY OF ADOPTION 15
(2002). Legal adoption served different interests over time, although there was always an
altruistic component or rationale. Massachusetts was the first state to pass a comprehensive
adoption law in 1851. David Ray Papke, Pondering Past Purposes: A Critical History of
American Adoption Law, 102 W. VA. L. REV. 459, 461 (1999); see also Chris Guthrie & Joanna
L. Grossman, Adoption in the Progressive Era: Preserving, Creating, and Re-creating
Families, 43 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 235, 237 (1999) (noting that “at least four other states” had
enacted less comprehensive statutes before Massachusetts).
35. These would include the committees responsible for monitoring the human rights
treaties.
36. Economic Covenant, supra note 1, at art. 10.
37. Id. at art. 10.
38. LAURA BRIGGS, SOMEBODY’S CHILDREN: THE POLITICS OF TRANSRACIAL AND
TRANSNATIONAL ADOPTION (2012) 59–93 (describing the United States’ treatment of Native
Americans).
39. See CRC, supra note 8.
40. See, e.g., Stark, supra note 29, at 189 (Section II.B.2(b) The Child’s Right to Belong).
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education should be directed to “develop[ing] . . . respect for [the child’s] cultural
identity, language and values.”41
In the United States, in contrast, ethnic identity and the community values of
nonwhite groups, including Native Americans and blacks, were historically viewed
as inferior to majoritarian (“white”) ethnicity and values.42 These identities and
values, it was understood, were a cause of their poverty. From the state’s perspective
in the 1950s and 1960s, the best that could be done for a Native American or black
child was to offer her a “fresh start,” “free” of her culture and her community. The
rights of the child to her culture and ethnicity, and the rights of the community to
their children, were not a factor because they were not viewed as “rights” in the
United States.
This is not to suggest simple causality here; the United States didn’t recognize
these rights for the same overdetermined reasons it didn’t ratify the instruments in
which they were set out. These include pervasive racism and a rarely questioned
belief in the superiority of Western civilization.43 The substance of those rights,
moreover, has evolved significantly since the 1960s, when the Covenants were
drafted, and the 1970s, when they came into force. But the early, and ongoing,
resistance of the United States cut it off from this development. Thus, although
Canada’s treatment of its indigenous children was similar to that of the United States,
Canada, which has ratified these instruments, has since apologized to its indigenous
people and promised millions in reparations.44

41. CRC, supra note 8, at art. 29.
42. There is a vast literature addressing what Ian Haney Lopez has called “the legal
construction of race.” See, e.g., IAN HANEY LÓPEZ, WHITE BY LAW: THE LEGAL CONSTRUCTION
OF RACE (rev. and updated, 10th anniversary ed. 2006) (analyzing ways in which race is legally
constructed); see also IAN HANEY LÓPEZ, DOG WHISTLE POLITICS: HOW CODED RACIAL
APPEALS HAVE REINVENTED RACISM AND WRECKED THE MIDDLE CLASS (2014). For thoughtful
analyses of the construction of race in the context of adoption, see, for example, infra Sections
I.B.1–3 and accompanying footnotes. See also Kai Jackson & Catherine E. McKinley, Sisters:
A Reunion Story, in THE ADOPTION READER: BIRTH MOTHERS, ADOPTIVE MOTHERS AND
ADOPTED DAUGHTERS TELL THEIR STORIES 190, 191–97 (Susan Wadia-Ells ed., 1995)
(describing adoptee's discovery that her biological father was white). For compelling accounts
of the process through which African American communities have reclaimed and affirmed
their community values, see Anthony Alfieri’s series of articles on community organizing in
Miami, especially Anthony V. Alfieri, Resistance Songs: Mobilizing the Law and Politics of
Community, 93 TEX. L. REV. 1459, 1463 (2015) (reviewing LEA VANDERVELDE, REDEMPTION
SONGS: SUING FOR FREEDOM BEFORE DRED SCOTT (2014)) (drawing on VanderVelde’s work
to consider “how to engage the diverse members of a community in ‘really getting a sense of
who they are’”), and Anthony V. Alfieri, Inner-City Anti-Poverty Campaign, 64 UCLA L.
REV. 1374, 1374 (2017) (describing a “Third Wave of anti-poverty campaigns . . . [grounded
in] ‘experiential reflection’”).
43. Asked what he thought of Western civilization, Gandhi supposedly replied, “I think
it would be a good idea.” Salil Tripathi, Opinion, Meanwhile: Gandhi, for One, Would Have
Found It Funny, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 21, 2004), https://www.nytimes.com/2004/01/21/opinion
/meanwhile-gandhi-for-one-would-have-found-it-funny.html
[https://perma.cc/B2KLUHYM].
44. Ian Austen, Canada to Pay Millions in Indigenous Lawsuit Over Forced Adoptions,
N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 6, 2017), https://nyti.ms/2yLyaxm [https://perma.cc/676D-BYAZ]; Ian
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The American failure to recognize poverty, ethnic identity, and community values
as human rights issues led well-intentioned reformers to promote disastrous domestic
policies. These include the Indian Adoption Project and the often-ill-considered
placement of black children with white families, as described below. Intercountry
adoption was a natural extension of these policies.
1. The Indian Adoption Project
By the 1950s, Native Americans were among the poorest people in the country.45
The Indian Adoption Project was conceived as a solution to the “Indian problem.”
As a local official explained:
If you want to solve the Indian problem you can do it in one generation.
You can take all of our children of school age and move them bodily out
of the Indian country and transport them to some other part of the United
States. Where there are civilized people . . . [.] If you take these kids
away and educate them to make their own lives, they wouldn’t come
back here.46
The Indian Adoption Project, initiated in 1958 and ending in 1968, placed children
“far from the reservation, geographically as well as culturally.”47 The Project placed
395 Indian children with white families.48
But the purpose of the federally sponsored Project was to prime the pump, to
encourage “the adoption of American Indian children on a nation-wide basis.”49 It
was a success. Since the demand for adoptees exceeded Project capacity, agencies in
the children’s home states arranged for their adoptions. By the early 1970s, between
twenty-five and thirty-five percent of Native American children had been legally
adopted by white families.50

Austen, Trudeau Apologizes for Abuse and ‘Profound Cultural Loss’ at Indigenous Schools,
N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 24, 2017), https://nyti.ms/2i45Y6g [https://perma.cc/P4BH-P6Q7].
45. Native American holdings shrank from 138 million acres of treaty land in 1887 to 48
million acres in 1934, 20 million acres of which were desert or semi-desert. This can be
attributed to over two hundred years of legalized property theft, genocidal policies, and
unscrupulous treatment by the United States government, including the failure to comply with
the treaties the United State itself had forced on them. BRIGGS, supra note 38, at 69.
46. Lila J. George, Why the Need for the Indian Child Welfare Act?, in THE CHALLENGE
OF PERMANENCY PLANNING IN A MULTICULTURAL SOCIETY 165, 169 (Gary R. Anderson,
Angela Shen Ryan & Bogart R. Leashore eds., 1997) (quoting Edward Rogers, Proceedings
of Minnesota Indian Conference (Apr. 11, 1950) (on file at Univ. of Minn., Bemidji, Social
Welfare History Archives)).
47. Id. at 169; see also DAVID FANSHEL, FAR FROM THE RESERVATION: THE TRANSRACIAL
ADOPTION OF AMERICAN INDIAN CHILDREN (1972).
48. George, supra note 46, at 169.
49. FANSHEL, supra note 47, at 35.
50. George, supra note 46, at 172–73. The point was to “‘kill the Indian in [them.]’ This
meant cutting their hair, teaching them Christianity, and forcing them to speak English.”
Gabby Deutch, A Court Battle Over a Dallas Toddler Could Decide the Future of Native
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Their families, as well as their tribes, were devastated by the children’s removal.
As Congress explicitly recognized when it passed the Indian Child Adoption Welfare
Act of 1978 (ICWA)51:
[T]here is no resource that is more vital to the continued existence and
integrity of Indian tribes than their children . . . [and] an alarmingly high
percentage of Indian families are broken up by the removal, often
unwarranted, of their children from them by nontribal public and private
agencies and . . . an alarmingly high percentage of such children are
placed in non-Indian foster and adoptive homes and institutions . . . .52
In Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield,53 the Supreme Court
examined the jurisdictional provisions “[a]t the heart of the ICWA.” 54 In Holyfield,
the parents, both members of the tribe, made sure that their illegitimate twin infants
were never physically present on the reservation, and voluntarily placed them with
non-Indian adoptive parents. The Court held that the ICWA established exclusive
jurisdiction in the tribal courts over Indian children domiciled there, and that the
“domicile of origin” for Indian babies was that of their mother.55
In a more recent decision, Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl,56 however, the Supreme
Court held that the ICWA did not bar the adoption of an Indian baby by non-Indians
where her Indian father had never had physical or legal custody of her.57 This ruling
returned the Indian father’s two-year-old daughter to the white couple who had
adopted her, from whom she had been removed by a prior court order. As Justice
Sotomayor noted in her dissent, the decision undercut the purpose of the ICWA,

American Law, ATLANTIC (Feb. 21, 2019), https://www.theatlantic.com/family/archive/2019
/02/indian-child-welfare-acts-uncertain-future/582628/ [https://perma.cc/LJ3T-BPGS].
51. 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901–1963 (2012). The purpose of the ICWA is
to protect the best interests of Indian children and to promote the stability and
security of Indian tribes and families by the establishment of minimum Federal
standards for the removal of Indian children from their families and the
placement of such children in . . . homes which will reflect the unique values of
Indian culture . . . .
Id. § 1902.
52. Id. § 1901(3)–(4). Congress explicitly noted, “that the States, exercising their
recognized jurisdiction over Indian child custody proceedings through administrative and
judicial bodies, have often failed to recognize the essential tribal relations of Indian people
and the cultural and social standards prevailing in Indian communities and families.” Id. §
1901(5).
53. 490 U.S. 30 (1989).
54. Id. at 36.
55. Id. at 48; see also Barbara Ann Atwood, Flashpoints Under the Indian Child Welfare
Act: Toward a New Understanding of State Court Resistance, 51 EMORY L.J. 587, 625–42
(2002) (criticizing the “existing Indian family” exception); Solangel Maldonado, Race,
Culture, and Adoption: Lessons from Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 17
COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 1, 27 (2008) (noting that the ICWA privileges biology over social,
legal, or political identification for purposes of determining who is Native American).
56. 570 U.S. 637 (2013).
57. Id. at 647–51.
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which “protects not only Indian parents’ interests but also those of Indian tribes.”58
The majority retreated from the recognition of the importance of children to their
communities, set out in the ICWA and confirmed in Holyfield.
2. Placing Black Children with White Families
In 1954 Congress amended the Social Security Act to allow agricultural and
domestic workers to qualify for Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC).59
This made black women and children in the South eligible for welfare under federal
law.60 In response, Mississippi enacted state-wide rules banning benefits for
“immoral” or “unsuitable” households, striking thousands of “illegitimate” children
from state welfare rolls.61 Florida took similar steps, excluding 14,000 from benefits
in 1959.62 Blaming black mothers for black poverty was also an effective strategy for
discrediting the civil rights movement.63 Northern liberals respected peaceful
protestors in suits and ties, but had little sympathy for unwed mothers.64
Arthur Flemming, the Secretary of the federal agency responsible for
administering AFDC, tried to counter these state rules by prohibiting states from
cutting benefits unless they provided alternatives for the affected children.65
Everyone understood that foster care or orphanages would be much more expensive
for the state.66 But Flemming’s plan backfired.67 Rather than discouraging states from
denying benefits to single black mothers, it discouraged these mothers from applying
for benefits, since by doing so they risked losing their children.68 These mothers
remained poor, but their families stayed together.69

58. Id. at 688–89; see also Jan Hoffman, Who Can Adopt a Native American Child? A
Texas Couple vs. 573 Tribes, N.Y. TIMES (June 5, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/
05/health/navajo-children-custody-fight.html [https://perma.cc/92JT-RNLG]. A Texas ruling
by federal judge Reed O’Connor, Northern District of Texas, holds the ICWA unconstitutional
because it requires Texas to apply federal law to its own domestic relations case. Id. An appeal
is pending from the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. Id.
59. Social Security Act Amendments of 1954, ch. 1206, 68 Stat. 1052 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
60. BRIGGS, supra note 38, at 39.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. See, e.g., DANIEL P. MOYNIHAN, OFFICE OF POLICY PLANNING & RESEARCH, U.S.
DEP’T OF LABOR, THE NEGRO FAMILY: THE CASE FOR NATIONAL ACTION (1965).
64. BRIGGS, supra note 38, at 8. As Briggs explains, “segregationists tried to make an
issue of unwed black mothers and their bastard children to counter the image of black dignity
and respectability” projected by Martin Luther King Jr. and other civil rights activists. Id.
65. Act of May 8, 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-31, 75 Stat. 75 (codified as amended in 42 U.S.C.
601–660).
66. BRIGGS, supra note 38, at 42.
67. See id.
68. Id.
69. See id.
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In the 1990s, then-President Bill Clinton promised to “end welfare as we know
it.”70 In 1996, Congress passed the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity
Reconciliation Act, which replaced AFDC with Temporary Assistance for Needy
Families (TANF).71 The new law also put a federal lifetime cap of five years on
welfare, although states were allowed to set even shorter limits.72
A year later, in 1997, Clinton signed the Adoption and Safe Families Act
(ASFA),73 which aimed “to double the number of foster children adopted annually
to 54,000 by 2002.”74 The ASFA requires a “permanency hearing” to be held within
one year after a child is put in foster care.75 If the child is still in foster care three
months later—with specific exemptions for relative care, the agency’s failure to
make reasonable efforts at reunification, or some other “compelling reason”—the
agency is expected to commence termination proceedings.76 The federal government
also pays states bonuses for children adopted above the state baseline.77 In 1999 there
were 46,000 adoptions and states received twenty million dollars in adoption
bonuses.78 As Professor Dorothy Roberts notes, the “number of children in foster
care . . . doubled . . . from 262,000 in 1982 to 568,000 in 1999.”79 By 2000, fortytwo percent of the children in foster care were black, even though only seventeen
percent of American children were black.80
3. Intercountry Adoption
International adoption began after World War II with Pearl S. Buck’s work to
save children in China from the chaos of the revolution, poverty, and communism.81
After adopting seven children herself, Buck opened her own agency, Welcome
House, when she was unable to place two mixed-race children with any of the

70. See, e.g., Alana Semuels, The End of Welfare as We Know It, ATLANTIC (Apr. 1,
2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2016/04/the-end-of-welfare-as-we-kn
ow-it/476322/ [https://perma.cc/7VG6-K5A3]; see infra Section II.A.2.
71. Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub. L.
No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (codified as amended in scattered sections of U.S.C.).
72. Id. § 103, 110 Stat. 2112.
73. Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-89, 111 Stat. 2115 (codified
as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
74. DOROTHY ROBERTS, SHATTERED BONDS: THE COLOR OF CHILD WELFARE 105 (2002).
75. Id. at 109–10.
76. Id. at 110.
77. Id. Baselines are determined by average adoptions between 1995 and 1997. Id.
78. Id. at 111.
79. Id. at 8.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 151. Best-selling author of the Pulitzer Prize-winning novel The Good Earth
and over seventy other books, and the first American woman to win the Nobel Prize in
literature, Buck was the first celebrity to use her fame to publicize international adoption. See
Brief Biography of Pearl S. Buck, PENN ARTS & SCI., https://www.english.upenn.edu
/Projects/Buck/biography.html [https://perma.cc/W7ZC-MWC5].
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existing agencies.82 After the Korean War, Harry and Bertha Holt saw a movie at an
evangelical church about war orphans and were able to get a special act of Congress
allowing them to adopt eight Korean orphans.83 The Holts were saving the children
for Jesus.84 They, too, went on to establish an international adoption agency.85 Buck
and the Holts were part of a triumphant, prosperous, postwar America that was ready
to save the world.
II. HOW GLOBAL CAPITALISM CHANGED THE GAME
A. How Neoliberalism Reshaped Human Rights
1. Individual Liberty and Freedom from Big Government
Neoliberalism began as the response of conservative economists Frederick Hayak
and Milton Friedman to the progressive social welfare policies of Franklin Delano
Roosevelt in the United States and Clement Atlee in the United Kingdom.86 Hayak
and Friedman felt that individual liberty was threatened by government regulations.87
Instead of state bureaucrats trying to manage the economy, they argued, markets
should be left free to draw on the energy and genius of individual market actors.88
Their emphasis on “liberty” extended outward, to foreign states and “freedom
fighters” resisting socialism,89 and inward, to the remnants of New Deal domestic
policies which, they argued, created a dependent “underclass.”90

82. See CONN, supra note 31, at 116–17 (“[I]n the sixty-plus years since Welcome House
and similar organizations began their work, upwards of 800,000 children have come to the
U.S. for adoption.”).
83. BRIGGS, supra note 38, at 153; see also Bertha and Harry Holt, ADOPTION HIST.
PROJECT,
https://pages.uoregon.edu/adoption/people/holt.htm
[https://perma.cc/8EZGXRDW] (last updated Feb. 24, 2012). As John Seabrook describes it: “Images of Holt getting
out of the plane, surrounded by babies, were published in newspapers and magazines across
the country. (Life ran a feature showing the Holt clan at home on the farm in Creswell in its
1955 Christmas issue.)” John Seabrook, The Last Babylift, NEW YORKER (May 3, 2010),
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2010/05/10/the-last-babylift.
84. See Bertha and Harry Holt, supra note 83 (“The Holts believed they were doing
God’s work . . . .”). The only requirements for prospective parents were that they were “saved”
and could afford the children’s airfare from Korea. Id.
85. Id.
86. See generally PIERRE DARDOT & CHRISTIAN LAVAL, THE NEW WAY OF THE WORLD:
ON NEO-LIBERAL SOCIETY 49–73 (Gregory Elliott trans., 2013) (2009).
87. DANIEL STEDMAN JONES, MASTERS OF THE UNIVERSE: HAYAK, FRIEDMAN, AND THE
BIRTH OF NEOLIBERAL POLITICS 2–3 (2012).
88. Id. at 332.
89. This included CIA support for the Contras in Nicaragua. See Military and Paramilitary
Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. Rep. 14 (June 27).
90. JONES, supra note 87, at 26.
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Neoliberal reforms were adopted after the widespread economic crises in the
1970s, when Keynesian prescriptions no longer seemed to work.91 Neoliberalism
came into its own after the elections of Margaret Thatcher in 1979 and Ronald
Reagan in 1981.92 They agreed that big government was the enemy. The first step
was to eliminate bureaucratic regulations that shackled businesses. 93 This included
environmental as well as health and safety regulations.94
The second step was to eliminate social safety nets. Social welfare programs were
slashed.95 Welfare—even TANF’s temporary assistance for needy families—and
health-care benefits (in the United States) were gutted or eliminated.96 Such
programs perpetuated dependency. Without such incentives, the neoliberals argued,
people would get jobs or start businesses.97 In contrast to Roosevelt’s unifying
appeals to all of those “down on their luck,” President Reagan called persistent
poverty a scam, in which some Americans exploited others. His account was divisive
and racist, suggesting that black “‘welfare queens’ . . . decked out in furs, [drove]
Cadillac[s] to the welfare office to pick up [their] check[s].”98

91. See id. at 119–220; DAVID HARVEY, A BRIEF HISTORY OF NEOLIBERALISM 57 (2005)
(“[T]he Thatcher phenomenon would surely not have arisen, let alone succeeded, if it had not
been for the serious crisis of capital accumulation during the 1970s.”).
92. See JONES, supra note 87 at 268.
93. DAVID M. KOTZ, THE RISE AND FALL OF NEOLIBERAL CAPITALISM 15–18 (2015); see
also Susan Marks, Four Human Rights Myths 8 (London Sch. of Econ. & Political Sci. Law
Dep’t, Working Paper No.10/2012, 2012) (noting “the rise . . . of the neo-liberal version of
‘private’ capitalism, with its now familiar policy prescription of privatisation, deregulation
and state retreat from social provision”).
94. KOTZ, supra note 93, at 17–19.
95. See, e.g., Andrew Glass, Clinton Signs ‘Welfare to Work’ Bill, Aug. 22, 1996,
POLITICO (Aug. 22, 2018, 12:09 AM), https://www.politico.com/story/2018/08/22/clintonsigns-welfare-to-work-bill-aug-22-1996-790321
[https://perma.cc/RA8Q-H9WM]
(discussing legislation that “ended welfare as an entitlement program[,] required recipients to
begin working after two years of receiving benefits[, and] placed a lifetime limit of five years
on benefits paid by federal funds . . . ”). Clinton said, “[It] gives us a chance we haven’t had
before to break the cycle of dependency that has existed for millions and millions of our fellow
citizens.” Id.
96. Id.
97. See JONES, supra note 87, at 268.
98. See Kathryn J. Edin & H. Luke Shaefer, Ronald Reagan’s “Welfare Queen” Myth:
How the Gipper Kickstarted the War on the Working Poor, SALON (Sept. 27, 2015, 7:59 PM),
https://www.salon.com/test/2015/09/27/ronald_reagans_welfare_queen_myth_how_the_gipp
er_kickstarted_the_war_on_the_working_poor/ [https://perma.cc/V46S-V5ZR] (“None of
these stereotypes even came close to reflecting reality, particularly in regard to race.”); see
also Josie Foehrenbach, Recent Publications, 19 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 261, 261–62 (1984)
(reviewing FRANCES FOX PIVEN & RICHARD A. CLOWARD, THE NEW CLASS WAR: REAGAN’S
ATTACK ON THE WELFARE STATE AND ITS CONSEQUENCES (1982)) (“Reagan’s attack on
welfare state income maintenance programs . . . represents one element of a comprehensive
strategy designed to enlarge business profits and achieve a massive upward redistribution of
income.”). In his recent book, The Queen, Josh Levin describes the life of Linda Taylor, the
inspiration for Reagan’s stereotype. JOSH LEVIN, THE QUEEN (2019). As Sam Dolnick notes in
his review, “Reagan’s stereotype was sweeping and offensive, but the woman at the center of
it did drive a Cadillac and wear fur coats and take advantage of state programs intended to
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The neoliberals’ third step was the privatization of the public sector.99 Once public
functions, such as maintaining parks and prisons, were outsourced to private
companies. Responsibility for dependent individuals, including children, the elderly,
and the disabled, was left to their families. Adoption, too, was privatized, as
explained below.100
But neoliberalism is not just a set of economic policies, as political theorist
Wendy Brown explains.101 Rather, it is a “normative order of reason developed over
three decades into a widely and deeply disseminated governing rationality, [which]
transmogrifies every human domain and endeavor, along with humans themselves .
. . .”102 Neoliberalism, she explains, rejects the idea that humanity can “craft and steer
its existence or even to secure its future.”103 For neoliberals, the free market,
unrestrained by irrational humans and free of onerous regulations, is our best
collective hope.
2. How Neoliberalism Transformed Adoption
Adoption in America has been transformed during the past few decades, reflecting
an increase in births to unmarried white women, the decreasing stigma for such
births, easier access to contraception, the greater autonomy of birth mothers, and an
increase in “open” adoptions.104 In open adoptions, either or both birth parents are
known to the adopting parents, and often expect to have some kind of ongoing
relationship with the child. During this same period, growing numbers of black
children have entered the foster care system.105 The ASFA made them available for
adoption on an accelerated basis.106 The Multiethnic Placement Act107 made them
available for adoption by white parents, despite the longstanding opposition of the
National Association of Black Social Workers.108

help the poor.” Sam Dolnick, The Life and Crimes of America’s Original ‘Welfare Queen,’
N.Y. TIMES (May 20, 2019) (emphasis in original), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/20
/books/review/josh-levin-queen-linda-taylor.html. Dolnick concludes that she was “a singular
American scoundrel who represented nothing but herself.” Id.
99. KOTZ, supra note 93, at 22.
100. See infra Section II.A.2.
101. See WENDY BROWN, UNDOING THE DEMOS: NEOLIBERALISM’S STEALTH REVOLUTION
30 (2015).
102. Id. at 9. Brown draws on Foucault here, for the notion of “normative reason” as an
“[ascendant] governing rationality” that imposes “economic values, practices, and metrics to
every dimension of human life.” Id. at 30.
103. Id. at 221.
104. See, e.g., Lisa Belkin, Now Accepting Applications for My Baby, N.Y. TIMES MAG.
(Apr. 5, 1998), https://www.nytimes.com/1998/04/05/magazine/now-accepting-applications
-for-my-baby.html [https://perma.cc/QNW8-7FM3] (describing the process through which a
birth mother selects the legal parents of her baby).
105. See supra Section I.B.2.
106. See supra notes 71–73.
107. Howard M. Metzenbaum Multiethnic Placement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-382,
108 Stat. 4056 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
108. Nat’l Ass’n of Black Social Workers, Position Statement on Trans-Racial Adoptions,
(Sept. 1972), reprinted in RITA JAMES SIMON & HOWARD ALTSTEIN, TRANSRACIAL ADOPTION
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The increase in the number of surrendering mothers choosing open adoption,
along with the declining number of available babies, contributed to a surge in
intercountry adoption by parents unable to adopt domestically, or unwilling to enter
into an open relationship with birth parents or to adopt black children. Intercountry
adoption enabled these parents to adopt babies or toddlers, usually without ever
meeting the birth parents, as described below.109 Intercountry adoption became more
appealing for some, and the only option for many.
B. A Neoliberal Solution for Children in Crisis
Free market fundamentalism shaped international trade and development through
the Washington Consensus110 Its gospel was “that the implementation of efficiency
enhancing rules is an uncontentious goal, that everyone stands to gain from free trade,
that property and contract rights are the paramount legal entitlements, and that rulebased regimes “level the playing field” and ensure fairness among otherwise unequal
parties.”111 This became the driving force of neoliberal globalization. The promise
was that global poverty would be reduced and eventually eliminated by economic
growth through trade.112
The Washington Consensus promised to generate prosperity; new businesses
would be spurred by an influx of Western cash. In countries like Vietnam, however,
where the annual income was $800, Western agencies offering fifty dollars for
“facilitating” adoptions or as “finders fees” promoted baby selling.113 The local

50–52 (1977); see also RICHARD TESSLER, GAIL GAMACHE & LIMING LIU, WEST MEETS EAST:
AMERICANS ADOPT CHINESE CHILDREN 8 (1999) (“U.S. domestic transracial adoptions have
been objected to since 1972 by the National Association of Black Social Workers on the
grounds that to deny black children their heritage and their identification as AfricanAmericans . . . is to commit a form of genocide.”); Twila L. Perry, Transracial and
International Adoption: Mothers, Hierarchy, Race, and Feminist Legal Theory, 10 YALE J.L.
& FEMINISM 101 (1998).
109. See infra Section II.B.
110. Robin Broad & John Cavanaugh, The Death of the Washington Consensus, 16 WORLD
POL’Y J. 79, 79 (1999); see also JONES, supra note 87, at 8, 332.
111. Kerry Rittich, Enchantments of Reason/Coercions of Law, 57 U. MIAMI L. REV. 727,
739–40 (2003).
112. See ARTURO ESCOBAR, ENCOUNTERING DEVELOPMENT: THE MAKING AND UNMAKING
OF THE THIRD WORLD 21–24 (2012).
113. These fees, modest by Western standards, may tempt local officials to cut corners. E.
J. Graff, The Lie We Love, FOREIGN POL’Y (Oct. 6, 2009, 5:14 PM), https://foreignpolicy.com
/2009/10/06/the-lie-we-love/ [https://perma.cc/5T3N-CW8M]; BLAIR ET AL., supra note 5, at
828; see also, e.g., Richard A. Posner, The Regulation of the Market in Adoptions, 67 B.U. L.
REV. 59, 60 (1987) (“Adoption agencies charge fees, often stiff ones, to adoptive parents, and
part of the agencies’ fee income goes to pay the medical expenses and other maintenance
expenses of the natural mother; thus the adoptive parents pay the natural mother, albeit
indirectly and at a regulated price, to give up her child. In “independent” adoptions, which are
arranged through a lawyer or obstetrician, the element of sale is even more transparent . . . .”).
Babies, similarly, have been viewed as “exports.” Robert S. Gordon, The New Chinese Export:
Orphaned Children--An Overview of Adopting Children from China, 10 TRANSNAT’L LAW.
121 (1997).
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people urging their friends or cousins to surrender their babies for cash were
“entrepreneurs.” There were no social safety nets to assure that families had food,
shelter, or healthcare. There were no regulations governing orphanages or adoption
services, no standards to which those purporting to provide such services could be
held. In Cambodia, for example, investigators described a shack with a handwritten
sign, “Orphanage,” and babies lying in their own waste in rusty cribs.114
The numbers of babies and young children adopted increased steadily after the
end of the Cold War, peaking in 2004, when roughly 45,000 babies were adopted
internationally, half of whom came to the United States.115 But as Nigel Cantwell, an
expert on child welfare and adoption systems in Eastern Europe and Central Asia,
explained: “There are simply not enough healthy, adoptable infants to meet Western
demand—and there’s too much Western money in search of children. As a result,
many international adoption agencies work not to find homes for needy children but
to find children for Western homes.”116 Asked how many healthy babies would be
“available for international adoption if money never exchanged hands,” Cantwell
replied, “I would hazard a guess at zero.”117
The disparity between supply and demand resulted in widespread trafficking,
which has been documented in countries of origin, including Cambodia, Guatemala,
Nepal, Vietnam, India, and, on a smaller scale, in Haiti, Sierra Leone, Congo, and
Uganda.118 In addition, there have been allegations of corruption in China, Russia,
and South Korea.119 Some of these cases involved agencies lying to parents, telling
them, for example, that their children would be educated in America and would send
for their parents when they were older.120 In other cases, children were simply
abducted.121
As these abuses were exposed, programs were shut down or put on hold. Some
receiving states imposed moratoria, refusing to accept children from states that did

114. D. Marianne Blair, Safeguarding the Interests of Children in Intercountry Adoption:
Assessing the Gatekeepers, 34 CAP. U. L. REV. 349, 356–58 (2005).
115. Elizabeth Bartholet, International Adoption: The Human Rights Position, 1 GLOBAL
POL’Y 91, 92, 95 (2010).
116. Graff, supra note 113.
117. Id.
118. BLAIR ET AL., supra note 5, at 825–29; see also Elizabeth Bartholet, International
Adoption: The Human Rights Issues, in BABY MARKETS: MONEY AND THE NEW POLITICS OF
CREATING FAMILIES 94 (Michele Bratcher Goodwin ed., 2010); Peter Selman, The Rise and
Fall of Intercountry Adoption in the 21st Century: Global Trends from 2001 to 2010, in
INTERCOUNTRY ADOPTION 7 (Judith L. Gibbons & Karen Smith Rotabi eds., 2012); Sara
Dillon, Making Legal Regimes for Intercountry Adoption Reflect Human Rights Principles:
Transforming the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child with the Hague
Convention on Intercountry Adoption, 21 B.U. INT’L L.J. 79 (2003); Shani M. King, Owning
Laura Silsby’s Shame: How the Haitian Child Trafficking Scheme Embodies the Western
Disregard for the Integrity of Poor Families, 25 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 1 (2012); Smolin, supra
note 7.
119. BLAIR ET AL., supra note 5, at 825.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 829.
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not comply with the Hague Convention standards.122 Intercountry adoptions have
plummeted. In 2017, there were only 4714 international adoptions to the United
States. 123
Some argue that it will always be better for a child to be raised in the affluent
West, even if she is raised in a family and community where she is the only child of
color.124 But adoptees from Korea have described the racism confronting them in
white suburbs and the white parents reluctant to acknowledge it.125 Black adoptees
have described their sense of isolation and their difficulties “fitting in” with black as
well as white communities.126 As the National Association of Black Social Workers
has insisted since the 1970s, integration should not be the responsibility of children
of color.127 In the United States, however, these are viewed as policy considerations
rather than human rights issues. They were explicitly rejected in the Multiethnic
Placement Act, which bars placement based on ethnicity.128

122. Termination was often abrupt, leaving would-be adoptive parents in limbo. See, e.g.,
Rachel L. Swarns, A Family, for a Few Days a Year, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 8, 2012),
https://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/09/world/americas/stalled-adoption-program-in-guatemal
a-leaves-families-in-limbo.html?pagewanted=1&_r=0&ref=world [https://perma.cc/JQK5M249] (describing the Carrs, who traveled nine times to Guatemala, trying to expedite the
adoption of Geovany, who they met as a toddler). Several states objected to Guatemala’s
accession to the Hague Convention on the ground that it was unable to comply with its
requirements. See Status Table, HAGUE CONFERENCE ON PRIVATE INT’L LAW,
http://www.hcch.net/en/instruments/status-table [https://perma.cc/F6TS-WV6G] (noting
objections of five states). Closing troubled adoption programs may still leave children at risk.
See Azam Ahmed, A Locked Door, a Fire and 41 Girls Killed as Police Stood by, N.Y. TIMES
(Feb. 14, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/14/world/americas/guatemala-shelterfire-trial.html [https://perma.cc/V29J-DK7S] (describing a fatal fire in a group home for atrisk children in Guatemala).
123. U.S. STATE DEP’T, ANNUAL REPORT ON INTERCOUNTRY ADOPTION NARRATIVES
1 (2017).
124. See, e.g., Bartholet, supra note 118, at 94. See generally Kim Forde-Mazrui, Black
Identity and Child Placement: The Best Interests of Black and Biracial Children, 92 MICH. L.
REV. 925 (1994) (noting that black and biracial children raised by white parents generally
do well).
125. ELEANA J. KIM, ADOPTED TERRITORY: TRANSNATIONAL KOREAN ADOPTEES AND THE
POLITICS OF BELONGING (2010); Susan Soon-Keum Cox, Ritual, 9 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM
17 (1997).
126. Susan R. Harris, Race, Search, and My Baby-Self: Reflections of a Transracial
Adoptee, 9 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 5, 5–10 (1997). See generally, Ruth G. McRoy, Zena
Oglesby & Helen Grape, Achieving Same-Race Adoptive Placements for African American
Children: Culturally Sensitive Practice Approaches, in SERVING AFRICAN AMERICAN
CHILDREN (Sondra Jackson & Sheryl Brisset-Chapman eds., 1999).
127. See supra note 108.
128. See supra notes 107–108 and accompanying text.
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III. INTERCOUNTRY HUMAN RIGHTS FOR THE NEW GILDED AGE
David Harvey argues that the real goal of neoliberalism was to restore wealth to
the top one percent of the population.129 In the developed global North, social safety
nets have been slashed. Environmental regulations, along with health and laborsafety regulations, have been rescinded, or are not enforced. Once-public services,
from education to neighborhood security, have been privatized. In the “developing”
global South—the site of most manufacturing that still requires humans rather than
robots—there were few social safety nets to slash, or regulations for businesses to
worry about.
While the world is wealthier than ever before, global poverty has in fact increased.
This Part explains this apparent paradox by showing how the Great Recession led to
unprecedented inequality.130 It then explains why intercountry adoption requires
intercountry human rights. It concludes by suggesting how intercountry human rights
might operate in practice.
A. The New Gilded Age
1. The Global Recession
Neoliberalism promised that globalization and capitalism would improve human
well-being where badly managed, often corrupt, social welfare schemes had failed.
This seemed plausible to many before the Great Recession of 2008.131 In 2007, the
subprime mortgage market collapsed in the United States. The housing bubble burst
and markets panicked, triggering a global recession.132
The United States economy constituted such a large proportion of the global
economy that when it sank, it took the rest of the world with it.133 In addition, the
United States exported its recession because it had already exported its neoliberal
philosophy of deregulation, privatization, and slashed social safety nets.134 The Great
Recession spread like wildfire because neoliberal globalization had already
eliminated the barriers that might have slowed it.

129. HARVEY, supra note 91, at 15–18 (drawing on the analyses of data by Gérard Duménil
and Dominique Lévy, charting the “extraordinary concentrations of wealth and power
emerging all over the place”).
130. See generally Barbara Stark, How the Age of Rights Became the New Gilded Age:
From International Antidiscrimination Law to Global Inequality, 47 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L.
REV. 151, 177–86 (2015).
131. JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, MAKING GLOBALIZATION WORK 68 (2006).
132. JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, FREEFALL: AMERICA, FREE MARKETS, AND THE SINKING OF THE
WORLD ECONOMY 21–24 (2010) [hereinafter STIGLITZ, FREEFALL]. Twenty-five percent of
U.S. mortgages were held by foreign banks. Id. at 21.
133. Id.
134. See, e.g., Joseph M. Schwartz, Democracy Against the Free Market: The Enron Crisis
and the Politics of Global Deregulation, 35 CONN. L. REV. 1097 (2003); see also Stark, supra
note 130, at 178–79.
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Those in low income states were especially vulnerable.135 They were immediately
hit by the collapse in global demand. Remittances—which have always dwarfed
foreign aid—from the United States and Europe fell.136 The crises hit especially hard
because social safety nets were already weakened by structural adjustment programs
(SAPs) foisted on developing states by the IMF and by ‘austerity’ adopted in the
European Union and foisted on struggling states like Greece and Italy.137
2. Unprecedented Inequality
Ten years ago, the World Bank reported a broad reduction in extreme poverty.138
While there was a drop in the number of people living below one dollar per day,
“[t]he number of people living between $1.25 and $2 has almost doubled from 648
million to 1.18 billion between 1981 and 2008.”139 As the World Bank put it, there
are “More Relatively-Poor People in a Less Absolutely-Poor World.”140 As Thomas
Piketty has shown, birth predicts wealth as certainly as it did during the Gilded
Age.141
While there has been an increase in total global wealth, global inequality grew
until 2015, when the top 1% owned 47.5% of it.142 If, as Friedman predicted and the
Washington Consensus promised, neoliberalism was intended to benefit everyone, it

135. STIGLITZ, FREEFALL, supra note 132, at 23; see also Mark Weisbrot, Globalization for
Whom?, 31 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 631, 632 (1998) (“The Asian economic crisis also threw a
wrench into the machinery of financial liberalization. The crisis opened a whole new debate
over how to protect national economies from the instability caused by international capital
flows. Even more importantly, the crisis has caused people to question the role of globalizing
institutions, such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), in dealing with international
economic problems.”).
136. STIGLITZ, FREEFALL, supra note 132, at 24. Remittances were further reduced because
the money transfer companies that enabled families to send money to keep their children in
school were often the same companies that were used to send money to terrorist groups, such
as the Shabab in Somalia. Nicholas Kulish, Somalis Face a Snag in Lifelines from Abroad,
N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 4, 2013), https://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/04/world/africa/somalis-face
-snag-in-lifeline-from-relatives-working-abroad.html [https://perma.cc/8V8P-GP5N].
137. STIGLITZ, FREEFALL, supra note 132, at 24.
138. Annie Lowrey, Dire Poverty Falls Despite Global Slump, Report Finds, N.Y. TIMES
(Mar. 6, 2012), https://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/07/world/extreme-poverty-down-despite
-recession-world-bank-data-show.html [https://perma.cc/5XWZ-44AJ].
139. SHAOHUA CHEN & MARTIN RAVALLION, AN UPDATE TO THE WORLD BANK’S
ESTIMATES OF CONSUMPTION POVERTY IN THE DEVELOPING WORLD 3 (Mar. 1, 2012),
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTPOVCALNET/Resources/Global_Poverty_Update_2
012_02-29-12.pdf [https://perma.cc/F6XC-KCBF]. As the Bank notes, moreover, “[l]ags in
data availability mean that 2008 is the most recent year we can make a reliable global estimate
. . . .” Id. at 1.
140. Shaohua Chen & Martin Ravallion, More Relatively-Poor People in a Less
Absolutely-Poor World (The World Bank Dev. Research Grp., Policy Research Working
Paper No. 6114, 2012).
141. THOMAS PIKETTY, CAPITAL IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 408–09, 421 (Arthur
Goldhammer trans., 2014).
142. ANTHONY SHORROCKS, JAMES DAVIES & RODRIGO LLUBERAS, CREDIT SUISSE,
GLOBAL WEALTH REPORT 2018, at 9 (2018).
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has been a spectacular failure. As Christine Lagarde, the Managing Director of the
International Monetary Fund (IMF), has noted, “There has been a staggering rise in
inequality—7 out of 10 people in the world today live in countries where inequality
has increased over the last three decades. And yet, we know that excessive inequality
saps growth, inhibits inclusion, and undermines trust and social capital.” 143
Children—everywhere—are disproportionately poor.144 Children make up nearly
half of the almost 900 million people living on less than $1.90 day; ten million of the
twenty-one million people who have been forcibly displaced from their homes are
children.145 Fifty-eight million children, between six- and eleven-years-old, are out
of school.146 Most of them are girls.147
Neoliberalism is not going to help them. Growth so robust that everyone will
enjoy its benefits is a fantasy. In fact, trade is no longer rising. 148 Even in the United
States, those on the bottom half of the income ladder “ha[ve] been completely shut
off from economic growth since the 1970s.”149 Families, trying to keep up with
capital that crosses continents at the stroke of a key, are already dispersed. Social
safety nets have already been slashed.
The Trump administration has recently added to the global pain. Since Ronald
Reagan announced the Mexico City Policy, also known as the Gag Rule, in 1981,
Republican presidents have barred the United States from funding any foreign NGO

143. Christine Lagarde, Managing Dir., Int’l Monetary Fund, Address at the Joint
IMF/World Bank Annual Meeting: The IMF at 70: Making the Right Choices—Yesterday,
Today, and Tomorrow 3 (Oct. 10, 2014).
144. UNICEF, THE STATE OF THE WORLD’S CHILDREN 2016: A FAIR CHANCE FOR EVERY
CHILD 72 (2016).
145. Id.
146. UNESCO INSTITUTE FOR STATISTICS, FIXING THE BROKEN PROMISE OF EDUCATION
FOR ALL: FINDINGS FROM THE GLOBAL INITIATIVE ON OUT-OF-SCHOOL CHILDREN 23 (2015).
147. Id.
148. See, e.g., Binyamin Appelbaum, A Little-Noticed Fact About Trade: It’s No Longer
Rising, N.Y. TIMES: THEUPSHOT (Oct. 30, 2016) https://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/31/upshot
/a-little-noticed-fact-about-trade-its-no-longer-rising.html
[https://perma.cc/TTV5-8Q4Y]
(“The volume of global trade was flat in the first quarter of 2016, then fell by 0.8 percent in
the second quarter . . . . Through the first nine months of 2016, trade fell by an additional $470
billion.”); Peter S. Goodman & James Kanter, With Europe-Canada Deal Near Collapse,
Globalization’s Latest Chapter Is History, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 21, 2016), https://www.nytimes
.com/2016/10/22/business/international/european-union-canada-trade-agreement-ceta.html
[https://perma.cc/3PAZ-QMSX] (“Liberalized trade has amplified economic growth, but the
spoils have been largely monopolized by wealthy and corporate interests. Recriminations over
the resulting economic inequalities are now so ferocious that modern history has been altered:
the phase of globalization that began with the ending of World War II is essentially over.”).
149. Patricia Cohen, A Bigger Economic Pie, but a Smaller Slice for Half of the U.S., N.Y.
TIMES (Dec. 6, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/06/business/economy/a-biggereconomic-pie-but-a-smaller-slice-for-half-of-the-us.html
[https://perma.cc/BZZ2-ZYJK]
(citing findings by economists Thomas Piketty, Emmanuel Saez, and Gabriel Zucman showing
that despite small increases in public programs, inequality has soared—the income of the
lower half remains roughly $16,000; the top 1% averages $1,304,800, eighty-one times
as much).
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that even counsels women regarding abortion as part of family planning services. 150
Democratic presidents have consistently stricken the Gag Rule upon taking office,
restoring roughly $575 million to international family planning programs. Trump has
extended the Gag Rule to include $8.8 billion in funding from the State Department,
United States Agency for International Development (USAID), and the Department
of Defense.151 This includes cutting the United States’ annual contribution to the UN
Population Fund, which promotes family planning. This unprecedented withdrawal
of support leaves millions of women without reproductive health care. A surge in
unplanned and unwanted births is likely.152 In February 2019, the Department of
Health and Human Services announced new rules regarding Title X, which would
effectively impose a gag rule on family planning services in the United States that
receive federal funds.153

150. See LUISA BLANCHFIELD, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41360, ABORTION AND FAMILY
PLANNING-RELATED PROVISION IN U.S. FOREIGN ASSISTANCE LAW AND POLICY 10–11 (2019).
The Helms Amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1973 already bans the use of United
States foreign aid for abortions. Id. at 3.
151. See Memorandum on the Mexico City Policy, 2017 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 63 (Jan.
23, 2017); Laura Bassett, Donald Trump Drastically Expands ‘Global Gag Rule’ on Abortion,
HUFFINGTON POST (May 16, 2017, 4:09 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com.au/2017/05/15/
donald-trump-drastically-expands-global-gag-rule-on-abortion_a_22092544/?utm_hp_ref=a
u-sexual-health [https://perma.cc/3YPV-PEMD]; see also Ann M. Starrs, The Trump Global
Gag Rule: An Attack on US Family Planning and Global Health Aid, 389 LANCET 485 (2017).
Starrs, President of the Guttmacher Institute, anticipates an even broader impact. As she
explains, “[u]nder Trump’s order, the gag rule now applies not only to US bilateral family
planning assistance (US$575 million for fiscal year 2016), but also to all ‘global health
assistance furnished by all departments or agencies’—encompassing an estimated $9.5 billion
in foreign aid.” Id. (footnotes omitted).
152. The burden on already stressed intercountry adoption networks is unlikely to be the
only effect. As Eugene Linden, author of THE ALMS RACE (1976), observed, “the [p]opulation
[b]omb [is] [s]till [t]icking.” Eugene Linden, Remember the Population Bomb? It’s Still
Ticking, N.Y. TIMES (June 15, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/15/opinion
/sunday/remember-the-population-bomb-its-still-ticking.html [https://perma.cc/3B88-VUF6].
The “population bomb” has been used since the 1970s to refer to the risks posed by unchecked
population growth, given the finite resources of the planet. The Green Revolution and
globalization may have postponed the reckoning, Linden argues, but the risks are even greater
now, in view of the current population figures (approximately 7.6 billion) and the impact of
climate change.
153. See Press Release, U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., HHS Releases Final Title
X Rule Detailing Family Planning Grant Program (Feb. 22, 2019), https://www.hhs.gov/about
/news/2019/02/22/hhs-releases-final-title-x-rule-detailing-family-planning-grant-program
.html [https://perma.cc/R5MX-VQ6T] (requiring clear separation between Title X funded
projects and programs where “abortion is a method of family planning”); see also Editorial
Board, Opinion, Birth Control Gets Caught Up in the Abortion Wars, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 26,
2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/26/opinion/title-x-rule.html [https://perma.cc
/YMH6-X64B]. On March 4, 2019, California filed a lawsuit to block the move, and “20 other
states, along with Washington, D.C., said that they would file a separate lawsuit challenging
the same restrictions.” Jose A. Del Real & Robert Pear, California Sues Trump Administration
to Block Restrictions to Family Planning Program, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 4, 2019),
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B. Why Intercountry Adoption Requires Intercountry Human Rights
1. Why the Hague Convention Is Not Enough
Adoption law is governed by national law, and different national laws are
coordinated by the Hague Convention on Intercountry Adoption.154 But the Hague
Convention is only binding when both the state of origin and the receiving state are
parties. Even if both states are parties, moreover, the Hague Convention provides
minimal human rights protection. Like many domestic adoption laws, the
Convention protects the rights of biological families and protects adoptive parents
from subsequent claims, by requiring the voluntary surrender of the child by the
biological parents.155 But the Hague Convention does not purport to subject the
adoption to human rights law.
Intercountry adoption advocates agree that the child must be “properly”
separated from both biological parents.156 This means that children cannot be sold or
abducted and parents cannot be deceived. They cannot be told, for example, that their
children will come back to them or send for them in the future.157 But the Hague
Convention does not require consideration of the violations of the parents’ human
rights that may have led to the surrender of the child. When babies were abandoned
by Chinese parents subject to the one-child policy, for example, the obvious coercion
did not preclude Hague adoptions.158
2. Human Rights Issues Raised by Adoption
The human rights issues that arise most frequently in the context of
intercountry adoption—gender, racial, or other forms of discrimination and the
denial of economic rights—are well known in both states of origin and receiving
states. The prohibition against racial discrimination is a jus cogens norm, from which
no derogation is permitted.159 Economic rights and the prohibition against gender
discrimination, if less well entrenched, are not only included in the International Bill

https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/04/us/california-lawsuit-title-x-family-planning.html
[https://perma.cc/E57K-CJR3].
154. Convention on Protection of Children and Cooperation in Respect of Intercountry
Adoption, supra note 13.
155. See id. at art. 4(c).
156. See id.
157. See Blair, supra note 114, at 365–74.
158. China became a party to the Hague Convention in 2005, and it entered into force in
China in 2006. The one-child policy officially ended on January 1, 2016. Feng Wang,
Baochang Gu & Yong Cai, The End of China’s One-Child Policy, BROOKINGS (Mar. 30,
2016), https://www.brookings.edu/articles/the-end-of-chinas-one-child-policy/ [https://perma
.cc/YQ5V-UBF6].
159. Antonio Cassese, A Plea for Global Community Grounded in a Core of Human
Rights, in REALIZING UTOPIA: THE FUTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 137, 139 (2012), reprinted
in PHILIP ALSTON & RYAN GOODMAN, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS 163 (2013).
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of Rights but in a growing number of national constitutions.160 Neither is addressed
in the Hague Convention, beyond the prohibition against baby selling.
Intercountry adoption raises human rights issues not only at the time of the
adoption but over the life span of the adoptee, as well as over the life spans of both
her biological and her legal parents. These rights, too, are missing from the Hague
Convention.
a. Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights
The economic rights set out in the Economic Covenant matter in intercountry
adoption because parents who lack these rights, including the reproductive rights that
are part of the Article 12 right to health,161 may be forced to abandon or surrender
children they never wanted or cannot support. Without an education162 and work,163
mothers and fathers can’t provide for their families. Without an adequate standard of
living including food, shelter, and clothing for themselves and their children,164
parents, especially single mothers, are forced to make desperate choices like
“surrendering” a child for adoption in order to feed her siblings.
Article 10 directly impacts intercountry adoption. It provides in pertinent part that,
“[t]he widest possible protection and assistance should be accorded to the family . .
. particularly for its establishment and while it is responsible for the care and
education of dependent children.”165 State support for young families, when they are
having their first or second child, would probably enable more families to keep their
children, rather than be forced to give them up for adoption. Article 10.2 requires
states to assure “[s]pecial protection . . . to mothers during a reasonable period before
and after childbirth. During such period working mothers should be accorded paid
leave or leave with adequate social security benefits.”166 Article 10.3 addresses the
rights of children, requiring the state to assure “[s]pecial measures of protection and
assistance . . . on behalf of all children . . . without any discrimination for reasons of
parentage . . . . Children . . . should be protected from economic and social
exploitation.”167 Article 12 requires the state to safeguard “the right of everyone to
the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health.”168
Article 12.2(a) specifically requires states to reduce stillbirth and infant mortality

160. David S. Law & Mila Versteeg, The Declining Influence of the United States
Constitution, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 762, 833–40 (2012) (noting that the United States
Constitution is no longer the most popular model because it omits economic rights and does
not prohibit gender discrimination).
161. Economic Covenant, supra note 1, at art. 12; see also Human Rights and Health,
WORLD HEALTH ORG. (Dec. 29, 2017), http://www.who.int/mediacentre/factsheets/fs323/en/
[https://perma.cc/FHL2-2R73].
162. Economic Covenant, supra note 1, at arts. 13–14.
163. See id. at arts. 7–8.
164. Id. at art. 11.
165. Id. at art. 10.1.
166. Id. at art. 10.2.
167. Id. at art.10.3.
168. Id. at art. 12.1.
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rates and to provide for the “healthy development of the child.”169 Both articles are
violated when intercountry adoption is promoted in places where people are
desperate, and safeguards are few.170
b. Nondiscrimination
The right against nondiscrimination is violated when babies are surrendered for
adoption on the basis of gender, race, or ethnicity. Gender discrimination in
adoptions takes many forms. Parents abandoned baby girls in China when the onechild policy was in effect, for example, hoping that their “one-child” would be a
boy.171 The parents’ discriminatory preference was perpetuated, rather than
addressed, by state support of intercountry adoption. Many of the adoptive families,
in contrast, preferred girls, so it could be argued that for the adoptees, at least, the
discrimination was mitigated.172
When the Sudanese girls fleeing civil war were “adopted” by families in the
refugee camp in Kenya, on the other hand, the adoptees were subject to a different
form of gender discrimination.173 As the UN High Commissioner for Refugees
reported, the girls were taken into foster families, but their role was frequently that
of “unpaid servants.”174 They cooked, cleaned, and gathered firewood for their foster
families. That was not their only value, nor the only reason they were taken in.

169. Id. at art. 12.2(a).
170. See Blair, supra note 114, at 355–65.
171. See Barbara Stark, Baby Girls from China in New York: A Thrice-Told Tale, 2003
UTAH L. REV. 1231, 1242 (2003).
172. It has been estimated, however, that a very small proportion—less than 1% of the
“missing baby girls” (girls predicted to be born statistically)—were adopted by foreign
parents, 90% of whom are from the United States. By 1995, China was the main source of
infant orphans coming to the United States. See id. at 1256 (explaining why American parents
adopt internationally). In the same year, Human Rights Watch published Death by Default, a
report on the appalling conditions in Chinese orphanages, including “dying rooms” where
unwanted babies were allowed to starve to death. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, DEATH BY
DEFAULT: A POLICY OF FATAL NEGLECT IN CHINA'S STATE ORPHANAGES (Robin Munro & Jeff
Rigsby
eds.,
1996),
https://www.hrw.org/legacy/summaries/s.china961.html#TOC
[https://perma.cc/D7EG-9U2T] (“[O]verall annual mortality at many of China's orphanages is
far higher than that documented in any other country.”). Death by Default found that most
abandoned children died within a year of their admittance to a state-run orphanage.
Orphanages were quickly closed to foreign visitors. See id. In 1996, the Ministry of Civil
Affairs assumed responsibility for adoptions. See id.
173. See Barbara Stark, Lost Boys and Forgotten Girls: Intercountry Adoption, Human
Rights, and African Children, 22 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 275, 277–81 (2003).
174. Emmanuel Nyabera, Man-Eating Lions, Crocodiles, Famine..., 1 REFUGEES 8, 8–9
(2002) (“Following Sudanese cultural traditions, many of the girls were absorbed into foster
homes and left to a very uncertain fate, overlooked and forgotten by the outside world.”); see
also Ishbel Matheson, The ‘Lost Girls’ of Sudan, BBC NEWS (June 7, 2002, 3:57 PM),
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/2031286.stm [https://perma.cc/U2C7-TADS] (describing
the chores of seventeen-year-old Grace Anyieth, “cooking, cleaning, washing, fetching water
from the distant stand-pipe, looking after her guardian’s children. In other words, she is an
unpaid servant.”).
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Families expect a bride price for a “daughter,” and several of the girls were given by
their foster families in arranged marriages,175 in violation of the African Charter and
CEDAW.176
Racial discrimination in intercountry adoption is similarly complicated. A child
whose surrender may have been triggered by bias against a half-white child in her
country of origin, for example, may find herself discriminated against in a white
American suburb because she is half Asian. 177 While it can be argued that a child is
always better off with parents who want her, rather than with parents who don’t,
parents’ desire for a child does not mean that they can cope with racism, or even
recognize it.178 Finally, cultures change and racism—and the experience of racism—
changes as the adoptee grows up.
As the adoptee matures, other human rights may become important to her,
including the rights to know her birth parents and her culture, to be part of a
community, and to be part of a country.179 The child’s “right to belong” has social,
psychological, and political consequences.180 Again, these rights are not addressed
in the Hague Convention.
C. Intercountry Human Rights
Intercountry human rights would effectively merge the state of origin and the
receiving state into a single functioning unit for purposes of assuring the human
rights involved in intercountry adoption. The legal mechanism for accomplishing this
could be a simple protocol to the Hague Convention, modeled after the African
Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child.181 Under the African Charter,
intercountry adoption is limited to those countries that are either parties to the Charter
or to the CRC.182 Under this proposal, similarly, the protocol would limit intercountry

175. See Matheson, supra note 174 (“Although an estimated 3,000 [girls] arrived in
Kakuma in 1992, most have simply vanished from official records. . . . According to Sudanese
custom, the girls were placed with guardians who were supposed to protect them. But many
foster parents - it seems - did not have the girls’ welfare at heart. In a place where poverty is
rampant, young women are a valuable commodity. They can be sold off for a good brideprice.”).
176. CEDAW, supra note 8, at 6–7 (prohibiting arranged and child marriages in
article 16).
177. See supra note 118.
178. See supra notes 127–28.
179. See CRC, supra note 8, at 3, 6 (articles 7 and 21).
180. There is growing literature on this subject, ranging from personal accounts to nascent
movements, including initiatives by Korean adoptees to find birth parents and reclaim their
culture. See, e.g., KIM, supra note 125; Marie Tae McDermott, Adopted Koreans, Stymied in
Search of Birth Parents, Find Hope in a Cotton Swab, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 27, 2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/28/world/asia/south-korea-adoptees-325kamra.html
[https://perma.cc/6CPW-ZC27] (explaining how “DNA testing offers a way around the
bureaucratic hurdles and flawed records”).
181. Organization of African Unity, African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the
Child, July 11, 1990, OAU CAB/LEG/153/Rev. 2 (entered into force Nov. 29, 1999).
182. Id. at 18 (article 24(b)). States such as the United States, which has not ratified three
out of four of the applicable human rights instruments, would not be eligible to ratify the
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adoption to states that are parties to the protocol. The protocol would grant
jurisdiction to each state over the relevant parties of the other state, including state
agencies directly involved in intercountry adoption, for purposes of assuring the
human rights of those affected by the proposed adoption.
This Section first sets out the theory in which this proposal is grounded. This
theory builds on a fundamental premise of human rights law (the recognition of the
individual as a subject of international law). Second, it draws on Thomas Paine’s
theory of state obligation, set out in Agrarian Justice.183 Third, it can be understood
as part of the ongoing fragmentation of international law. Finally, it reflects and
incorporates the growing resistance to neoliberalism.
This Section then sketches how the proposal might function in this context. It would
enable individuals to expose human rights violations. It might help some parents
keep their children, if that is what they want, or place them with another family while
maintaining some contact, if that is their choice. More ambitiously, it would make
the traditionally rigid boundaries of state sovereignty marginally more porous for
human rights.
1. In Theory
There is no need for any theoretical justification for the mechanism proposed here;
it is simply a treaty between, or among, consenting states. There is no encroachment
on state sovereignty. Why states should accede to such a treaty, and more broadly,
embrace the notion of intercountry human rights, is less straightforward.
a. The Individual’s Right to Petition
While this proposal stretches the paradigm of human rights as a matter exclusively
between a state and its own people, this paradigm has been expanding since its
inception. The proliferation of human rights treaty bodies and regional courts, and
the vast networks of international organizations and NGOs, which work together to
provide aid, healthcare, and technical assistance, suggest the scope of that
expansion.184
Allowing individuals to have access to specialized courts or committees through
optional protocols permitting a right of individual petition also expands the
paradigm. All but one of the ten main human rights treaty bodies provide for the
submission of individual petitions, although not all have entered into force.185 But
the international system is bogged down. There are simply too many reports to be
submitted and reviewed. Backlogs resulting in delays of up to seven years often make
the process pointless.186

Protocol until it had. Islamic states that do not recognize formal legal adoption would also be
excluded.
183. See THOMAS PAINE, Agrarian Justice: Opposed to Agrarian Law and to Agrarian
Monopoly, in PAINE: COLLECTED WRITINGS 396 (Eric Foner ed., 1995) (1797).
184. See, e.g., ALSTON & GOODMAN, supra note 159, 685–762 (giving an overview of the
UN system, the treaty bodies, and regional arrangements).
185. Id. at 808 n.26.
186. See id. at 842.
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Scaled down and adequately supported, however, the right of individual petition
has been remarkably popular over time. The European Court of Human Rights, for
example, established the right of individual petition in 1955.187 In 1998, Protocol No.
11 was adopted, making the right of petition mandatory.188 Between 2000 and 2009,
the Court received more than 330,000 applications and issued more than 11,000
judgments.189
b. The States’ Obligation
In Agrarian Justice, a short pamphlet written in 1795–96, the eighteenth-century
American philosopher Thomas Paine explained why the state should be required to
assure the necessities of life for all of its residents.190 In a state of nature, he
explained, everyone was free to hunt, fish, and gather whatever wild edibles were
available.191 This freedom was taken away by the state, however, when it established
the law of private ownership of property.192 The state had an obligation, accordingly,
to those who were effectively deprived of the ability to support themselves by these
new laws of private property.193
While the situation may be more complex today, as described in Part II, the same
basic principle should apply. It is not merely access to hunting, fishing, and wild
edibles that has been taken away, however, but the ability to participate in a global
economy, profits from which go mainly to investors.194 Providing individuals from
states of origin with limited access to specialized courts and agencies in receiving
states seems a modest recompense.
c. The Fragmentation of International Law
This proposal would be part of the ongoing fragmentation of international law;
that is, the proliferation of often overlapping laws and fora to address a range of
problems described in the Report of the International Law Commission on the
Fragmentation of International Law (“ILC Report”).195 As Ingrid Wuerth noted in

187. MARK WESTON JANIS & JOHN E. NOYES, INTERNATIONAL LAW: CASES AND
COMMENTARY 501 (5th ed., 2014).
188. Id. at 502.
189. Id.
190. See PAINE, supra note 183.
191. Id. at 7–8.
192. Id. at 9.
193. Id. at 10.
194. See Jared Bernstein, Yes, Stocks Are Up. But 80 Percent of the Value Is Held by the
Richest 10 Percent, WASH. POST (Mar. 2, 2017, 8:55 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com
/posteverything/wp/2017/03/02/perspective-on-the-stock-market-rally-80-of-stock-value-hel
d-by-top-10/ [https://perma.cc/W7GU-SAT5] (noting that within the top 10%, the share of
stock wealth held by the top 1% is roughly equal to the share held by the 90–99th percentiles).
While capital flows freely over state borders, moreover, humans must get permission to enter
a country and to stay there. Even those who clearly qualify as refugees have no right to asylum
in any particular place. They can only join the sixty-five million people waiting in refugee
camps for states to decide where they might go.
195. See Rep. of the Study Group of the Int’l Law Comm’n, Fragmentation of International
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connection with the Kiobel decision, “For all the downsides of fragmentation, the
resulting tumult provides an opportunity for human rights activists to achieve in one
forum what they could not in another.”196 This is an objective of the proposal here,
that is, the protection of human rights in one forum—here, an American forum—that
could not be achieved in the state of origin. The legal and administrative
infrastructure taken for granted in many receiving states does not exist in many states
of origin. Shutting down adoption programs that fall short of international standards
does not necessarily mean that a state plans to meet those standards and to spend
whatever may be needed to do so. An offer of assistance by a foreign agency, or a
penalty imposed by a foreign forum, might be more effective.
The “arc of the ATS litigation,” as Wuerth puts it,197 is instructive. She describes
the early cases like Filartiga,198 brought by human rights advocates who quickly
realized the value of the American legal system to those from states lacking the most
basic protections. In this context, too, the legal and administrative resources of the
global North could be invaluable for human rights advocates seeking support for
families in the global South. In the ATS context, moreover, the acts complained of
had no relation to the state in which relief was sought. Intercountry adoption, in
contrast, is driven by the economic gap between the developed global North and the
still-struggling global South, a gap from which the global North still profits.
In Wuerth’s account, ATS litigation was, in part, a victim of its own success, as
cases shifted from individual defendants represented by public interest groups to
corporate defendants such as Barclays, Chevron, Ford, and IBM, represented on both
sides by major firms.199 The risk of such a trajectory is remote in the context of
intercountry adoption, since the profits of multinational corporations are not at
stake.200
d. Resisting Neoliberalism
Finally, intercountry human rights can be understood as part of a growing
resistance to neoliberalism. The objective here is to deprivatize intercountry adoption

Law: Difficulties Arising from the Diversification and Expansion of International Law, 58th
Sess., May 1–June 9, Jul. 3–Aug. 11. 2006, U.N. Doc. A/CN4/L.682 (Apr. 13, 2006) (finalized
by Martii Koskenniemi, Chairman).
196. Ingrid Wuerth, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co.: The Supreme Court and the
Alien Tort Statute, 107 AM. J. INT’L L. 601, 621 (2013). In Kiobel, the Supreme Court brought
a halt to human rights litigation under the ATS. See, e.g., Anne-Marie Burley, The Alien Tort
Statute and the Judiciary Act of 1789: A Badge of Honor, 83 AM. J. INT’L L. 461 (1989). See
generally Barbara Stark, International Law from the Bottom Up: Fragmentation and
Transformation, 34 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 687 (2013).
197. Wuerth, supra note 196, at 621.
198. Filartiga v. Peña-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980); see also Burley, supra note 196.
199. Wuerth, supra note 196, at 604.
200. Other trajectories, such as the development of supportive transnational networks and
links, eventually, to a treaty body like those described in Gráinne de Búrca, Human Rights
Experimentalism, 111 AM. J. INT’L L. 277 (2017), seem more plausible. See generally THOMAS
RISSE, STEPHEN C. ROOP & KATHRYN SIKKINK, THE POWER OF HUMAN RIGHTS (2009)
(describing a “spiral” model of human rights development and its evolution during the first
decade of the twenty-first century).
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and establish or reinstate more effective social safety nets, along with sensible
regulations that better protect poor or otherwise marginalized parents and children.
The value of human rights law here is its insistence on placing human needs
before those of markets. Intercountry human rights recognize the bland, technical
imperatives of neoliberalism—deregulation, slashed social safety nets, and
privatization—as direct and deadly violations of human rights.201 Slashed social
safety nets contribute to grim outcomes regarding life expectancy and mortality.202
“Privatization” means that the cost of any “public” service must include an increment
for the private providers’ profit, even as those providers remain insulated from
accountability. Privatization directly—and often dramatically—contributes to the
sinking quality of life for those at the bottom.
2. In Practice
Intercountry human rights would enable individuals, or NGOs acting on behalf of
individuals, to seek enforcement of human rights through the courts or appropriate
agencies of partnering states. The shared commitment of the participating states to
the relevant human rights, including the child’s “right to know and be cared for by
his or her parents,”203 would establish the legal parameters of a claim.204 Only “if the
child cannot be placed in a foster or an adoptive family or cannot in any suitable
manner be cared for in the child’s country of origin” is intercountry adoption to be
considered under Article 21(b) of the CRC.205 The precise mechanisms applicable in
a particular case would depend upon the mechanisms already available to nationals,
the relationship between the states, their physical proximity, and the particular
human rights at stake.

201. Deregulation in London, which left fire safety to individual building managers, for
example, led to the Grenfell Tower fire, in which more than seventy-nine people died. Steven
Erlanger, After Grenfell Tower Fire, U.K. Asks: Has Deregulation Gone Too Far?, N.Y. TIMES
(June 28, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/28/world/europe/uk-grenfell-tower-firederegulation.html [https://perma.cc/T7AY-N8EJ]; Megan Specia, Would This London HighRise Past Muster in New York? Short Answer: No, N.Y. TIMES (June 27, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/27/world/europe/london-high-rise-fire-new-york-regulat
ion.html [https://perma.cc/F842-F7EV]. Deregulation is often linked to privatization.
“Deregulation also meant outsourcing responsibility for fire inspections to owners and
builders, instead of civil servants.” Erlanger, supra.
202. For example, life expectancy in northern China has fallen by five years because of air
pollution. Yuyu Chen, Avraham Ebenstein, Michael Greenstone & Hongbin Li, Evidence on
the Impact of Sustained Exposure to Air Pollution on Life Expectance from China’s Huai River
Policy, 110 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. U.S. 12936 (2013).
203. CRC, supra note 8, at art. 7.
204. Only if the right to know her parents is not possible, or contrary to the child’s best
interest, should a child be “ensure[d] alternative care.” Id. at art. 20.2.
205. Id. at art. 21(b).
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a. The Individual’s Right to Petition
The right of individual petition before a court or the appropriate agency of the
partnering state could be especially useful in this context, since the optional protocols
for individual communications have not yet come into effect for the Economic
Covenant or the CRC.206 Even if they do come into force, or even if a particular case
gives rise to a claim under the Civil Covenant’s optional protocol,207 an NGO
representing children or parents may well prefer a more specialized and focused
alternative, especially in view of the long delays associated with international
procedures. While states may be reluctant to accept a comprehensive right of
individual petition before an international body, moreover, a presumably simpler,
faster, much more limited right (applying only in the context of intercountry
adoption) might be more palatable, especially if it was linked to material support.
b. The States’ Obligation
As Professor Smolin notes, in China and Korea, abandonment or surrender of a
child is not usually caused by extreme poverty.208 In other states of origin, however,
intercountry adoptions are often grounded in poverty. As Smolin argues:
[I]ntercountry adoptions based on poverty [are] cruel and unethical,
compounding the vulnerability and suffering of the poor with the loss of
their children, and absurdly spending tens of thousands of dollars for an
intercountry adoption when perhaps one hundred dollars or less would
have been sufficient to maintain the child with her family.209
The human rights of the parents, as well as the child, are violated when parents are
forced to surrender babies because they cannot afford to take care of them.
As economist Andy Sumner has shown, most of the poorest people in the world
live in middle-income countries, which are presumably able to assure the basic needs
of their nationals.210 It is not clear whether the parents who surrender their children
for adoption are in this group. If they are, the proposal here could help them hold
their states accountable. According to the World Bank, moreover, all of the states of

206. ALSTON & GOODMAN, supra note 159, at 840.
207. See Civil Covenant, supra note 1, at 302. The optional protocol to which I refer is the
First Optional Protocol permitting individuals to file communications with the Human Rights
Committee.
208. David M. Smolin, Child Laundering: How the Intercountry Adoption System
Legitimizes and Incentivizes the Practices of Buying, Trafficking, Kidnapping, and Stealing
Children, 52 WAYNE L. REV. 113, 127–28 (2006).
209. Smolin, supra note 7, at 1072.
210. Andy Sumner, Global Poverty and the New “Bottom Billion” Revisited: Exploring
the Paradox that Most of the World’s Extreme Poor No Longer Live in the World’s Poorest
Countries 3 (May 14, 2012) (working paper), https://www.ids.ac.uk/files/dmfile/Andy
SumnerGlobalPoverty14May2012.pdf [https://perma.cc/6NL9-W9JT].
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origin provide some form of paid parental leave.211 They are also parties to the
Economic Covenant and are bound by Articles 10 and 12.212
Channeling subsidies or other forms of aid from one state to the other might also
be an option. Again, this is hardly a radical proposition. Interstate aid is often used
as a carrot to promote human rights.213 It has also been commonplace for nationals
in receiving states to provide substantial “gifts” to agencies in states of origin. As
Professor Bartholet argues, intercountry adoption increases awareness of the
problems facing children in sending countries, exposing adoptive families and their
communities to the plight of the children left behind.214 Some programs made support
part of the process, like the Chinese orphanages that required parents to make $3000
“donations” before they could leave with a child. Nor, she insists, do intercountry
adoptions relieve the pressure on sending countries to address them.215 On the
contrary, she asserts, it highlights them. Indeed, this is often touted as one of the
benefits of intercountry adoption.216
But Bartholet conflates aid that perpetuates intercountry adoption with aid that
might prevent it. An intercountry human rights approach, in addition to taking the
human rights of all the parties into account, would also favor approaches that enable
more parents to keep their children.217 Individual donations by adopting parents
should be prohibited because they privilege the wealthy and commodify the
relationship between the parents and the agency. Such payments may be especially
problematic where human rights violations are ongoing, as in China during the era
of the one-child policy.218
CONCLUSION: TOWARD INTERCOUNTRY HUMAN RIGHTS
This Article proposes a new, albeit modest, mechanism to support human rights,
specifically those at risk in intercountry adoption. It has explained how the American
version of human rights pushed aside a larger vision of human well-being and how
it promoted privatized “solutions,” such as intercountry adoption, instead. It has
argued that those who have benefitted from neoliberalism owe something to those
who have been penalized by it, just as Thomas Paine argued that the eighteenthcentury state owed something to those it effectively deprived of a livelihood. It has

211.
212.
213.
214.

See OECD Family Database, OECD, www.oecd.org/els/family/database.htm.
See supra Section III.B.2.
ALSTON & GOODMAN, supra note 159, at 1117–22.
Elizabeth Bartholet & David Smolin, The Debate, in INTERCOUNTRY ADOPTION:
POLICIES, PRACTICES AND OUTCOMES 233, 234–35 (Judith L. Gibbons & Karen Smith Rotabi
eds. 2012).
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. Like the Hague Convention, this approach would not necessarily favor all forms of
in-country care, including group homes and orphanages, over intercountry adoption. Most
children’s advocates consider the quality of in-country care available, as well as the age and
circumstances of the particular child. See, e.g., BLAIR ET AL., supra note 5, at 834–46.
218. This may be difficult to assess. See supra note 172 (describing the limited impact of
adoption as well as the often-grim alternatives in China); supra note 122 (describing problems
with adoptions and group homes in Guatemala).
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sketched how intercountry human rights might work in the context of intercountry
adoption. Finally, this Article has suggested how intercountry human rights can be
used to resist the domination of markets and the unprecedented concentration of
global wealth which is its result.

